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This paper documents and analyses the volatility of economic growth in rich 
and poor countries.  It concludes that whereas volatility has declined almost 
universally  in  advanced  countries,  the  picture  is  more  mixed  for  developing 
countries.    The  paper  then  concentrates  on  the  case  of  India,  where  GDP 
volatility has declined over the past two decades.  The evidence shows that the 
move away from agriculture has stabilised the economy.  Increased financial 
depth and more favourable developments in terms of trade have had a similar 
effect.    Finally,  the  paper  discusses  the  relationship  between  economic 
instability and insecurity at a general level. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This  paper  is  concerned  with  variations  in  economic  growth  rather  than  the 
average rate of growth.  It is a subject not often studied particularly in relation to 
developing  countries.  Compared  with  hundreds  of  studies  on  the  level  of 
economic growth, there are very few studies at all on instability of economic 
growth in poor countries. 
 
The present paper hopes to fill this gap to some extent by documenting and 
establishing  some  stylised  facts  about  economic  instability  in  rich  and  poor 
countries  alike.  The  specific  issues  discussed  are:  Has  economic  instability 
increased or decreased over time in the two groups of countries? Are developed 
countries more stable than developing countries? These questions derive their 
significance from four different literatures.  
 
Firstly,  there  is  the  literature  on  globalisation  and  on  the  outcomes  of 
globalisation  in  terms  of  economic  growth  and  economic  instability.  One 
important claim of the proponents of globalisation is that globalisation would 
lead to faster economic growth, although it may be more unstable than before 
(ILO, 2004, IMF Outlook, 1999). For the 1980s and in fact up to 1995, the 
average  growth  rate  of  the  OECD  economies  during  the  post-globalisation 
period appears to have been comprehensively lower than during the golden age, 
i.e. almost every OECD country except Turkey had lower growth in the 1980 to 
1995 period than in the period 1950-1973. It was also claimed (e.g. ILO, 2004) 
that  most  developing  countries  had  recorded  both  lower  growth  and  greater 
volatility in the 1980s and 1990s compared with before. 
 
In  the  analysis  below  we  will  find  that  post-globalisation  period  growth 
performances have varied a great deal. In both rich and poor countries, there are 
clear  gainers  and  losers.  It  is  not  the  case  of  comprehensive  failure  or 
comprehensive success.  
 
The second closely related literature concerns financial globalisation. Opinion is 
divided  on  how  financial  globalisation  affects  instability  in  rich  and  poor 
countries.  The  proponents  argued  that  by  providing  liquidity,  financial 
globalisation would help smooth the consumption paths of economies subject to 
various internal and external shocks. The opponents led by Joseph Stiglitz (see 
e.g.  Stiglitz,  2000  and  Easterly  et  al.,  2001)  suggested  that  in  the  case  of 
developing countries there is widespread evidence that volatility has increased 
without necessarily leading to faster economic growth. A theoretical basis for 
this  observation  is  provided  for  instance  by  information  theory,  and  the   2 
argument  that  a  financial  contract  is  rather  different  from  a  normal  contract 
involving commodities or goods.    
 
The third strand of literature that is relevant is the concern with social security 
for  the  poor.  Because  of  the  fear  that  globalisation  might  lead  to  higher 
economic  instability,  international  financial  institutions  (IFIs)  among  others 
have  recommended  that  safety  nets  should  be  set  up  for  those  who  are  left 
behind by globalisation to mitigate the effects of instability. How should the 
governments  in  societies  deal  with  the  poor  subject  to  the  loss  of  jobs  and 
income  as  a  result  of  economic  instability?  What  kind  of  insurance 
arrangements would be feasible and appropriate? Even if economic instability is 
temporary, its effects on the poor can be long lasting. We will not touch upon 
these  questions  directly  in  this  paper,  but  they  are  worth  mentioning  in  the 
broader context. 
 
The fourth strand of literature to which the analysis of instability is related to is 
the  whole  grand  question  of  business  cycle  in  economic  analysis.  Has  the 
business cycle become obsolete or have we learned to tame it better than before, 
and what are the prognoses for the future? As we shall see below, many rich 
countries have enjoyed unprecedented stability. One question is whether it is 
likely to last. This question is important as it involves the question of how the 
large  American  current  account  and  budget  deficits  will  be  brought  under 
control without jeopardising world economic growth. 
 
This paper is work-in-progress rather than a completed piece of research. Apart 
from establishing stylised facts on economic instability we will review some of 
the available hypotheses for explaining these facts. We will concentrate on the 
Indian case, where there has been a trend increase in GDP growth over the last 
two decades and the standard deviation of GDP growth has also declined over 
this  period.  We  will  present  the  results  of  time  series  analysis  on  the 
determinants  of  volatility  in  India.  Finally,  we  also  look  at  the  relationship 
between economic instability and insecurity at a general level. In the end, we 
briefly also speculate about the consequences of a U.S. hard lending on the 
world economy, as a result of current international monetary imbalances.  
 
Section 2 focuses on economic instability in advanced countries. Section 3 looks 
at the same in developing countries. Section 4 discusses possible determinants 
of instability. Section 5 describes changes in volatility in India, and section 6 
presents  some  evidence  from  econometric  analysis  on  the  determinants  of 
volatility in India. Section 7 explores the relationship between volatility and 
insecurity at a general level and section 8 concludes.   3 
2 Economic volatility in advanced countries 
 
Martin  and  Rowthorn  (2004)  have  recently  written  about  the  changes  in 
economic instability in advanced countries. They look at four economic regions 
–  the  US,  the  Euro  area,  the  UK  and  Japan,  and  with  the  use  of  a  small 
macroeconomic model attempt to explain the forces behind the noticeable drop 
in economic volatility. The authors divide the 50 year period into four periods: 
1954-1973 being the “Golden age”, 1974-1983 the turbulent decade of large oil 
price and other shocks, 1984-1993 the decade of disinflation and 1994-2003 the 
benign decade of clear moderation in business cycle activity. The measure used 
for volatility is standard deviation.
i  
 
The results from this study are show below in tables 1-3. Volatility of both 
inflation  and  GDP  growth  volatility  in  the  world  as  a  whole  has  declined 
somewhat in the last two decades; in the case of real GDP growth this has 
occurred mainly in the period 1994-2003, and in the case of inflation in the last 
two decades. The volatility of both GDP growth and inflation is lower in the 
period 1984-2004 than in 1954-1983 in nearly all the seven advanced countries. 
The frequency of severe recessions (table 3) has also dropped in some of these 
countries, and increased only in Japan. 
 
Table 1 Standard deviations of annual real GDP growth 
GDP growth volatility             
%  1954-1973  1974-1983  1984-1993  1994-2003 
World  4,3  5,3  4,3  3,0 
United States  2,5  2,8  1,9  1,2 
Germany  2,4  2  1,9  1 
France  1,2  1,4  1,6  1,2 
Italy  1,5  2,7  1,4  0,9 
United Kingdom  1,8  2,2  2,0  0,8 
Japan  2,4  1,9  2,0  1,5 
Source: Martin and Rowthorn (2004) 
 
Table 2 Standard deviations of annual GDP price inflation 
Inflation volatility             
%  1954-1973  1974-1983  1984-1993  1994-2003 
United States  1,6  1,9  0,7  0,4 
Germany  1,9  1,2  1,1  0,8 
France  2,5  1,2  1,6  0,6 
Italy  3,0  2,4  2,2  1,2 
United Kingdom  2,4  6,0  1,7  0,7 
Japan  2,7  5,4  1,0  0,9 
Source: Martin and Rowthorn (2004) 
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Table 3 Frequency of severe recessions, percentage share 
   1954-1973  1974-1983  1984-1993  1994-2003 
United States  10  40  10  0 
Germany  5  20  10  10 
France  0  10  10  0 
Italy  0  10  10  0 
United Kingdom  0  40  10  0 
Japan  0  10  0  20 
Source: Martin and Rowthorn (2004) 
Number of years when GDP growth is less or equal to 0% shown as a percentage share of 
number of years in period 
 
 
3 Economic volatility in developing countries 
 
This section looks at economic volatility in the developing world, on which 
there  are  few  studies.  It  presents  evidence  of  volatility  of  GDP  growth  and 
inflation over the years 1960-2004, and focuses on Asia, Latin America and 
Africa,  with  a  special  section  dedicated  to  India.  Volatility  is  measured  as 
standard deviation.
ii Middle Eastern and transition countries are excluded due to 
lack of time series data. The regional figures are based on all available countries 
as opposed to just those shown in the tables below.  
 
When the two years immediately following the East Asian crisis are removed 
(last  column  in  table),  this  is  no  longer  the  case.  For  most  Asian  countries 
consumer price volatility is highest in the period 1972-1981 and then falls, with 
the exceptions of Indonesia and the Philippines.  
 
In  South  Asia,  GDP  volatility  has  declined  clearly  in  India,  Pakistan  and 
Bangladesh in the past two decades. The variance of real GDP growth for the 
period 1982-2004 is significantly lower than for the period 1961-1981 at the 
99% level for the South Asia aggregate. Despite the East Asian financial crisis 
of 1997, the variance is also significantly lower for the period 1982-2004 than 
1961-1981 at the 99% level for the East Asia and Pacific aggregate. However, 
from the individual countries, volatility has declined considerably only in China 
in 1982-2004 and appears to have undergone a statistically significant increase 
in Malaysia, Thailand the Philippines.  
 
This evidence suggests that volatility has declined over the last two decades in 
South Asia and less so, but also in the East Asia region as a whole. Among the 
latter country group, volatility has clearly declined for China, but whether this is 
the case for the other countries is not clear; it is more so the case for inflation 
than GDP growth. There has been a statistically significant fall in inflation in 
most of the Asian countries shown here. Thus, the evidence does not suggest   5 
that there would have been a marked increase in economic instability in the last 
two decades, when these countries were opening up their economies, and the 
volatility induced by the East Asian crisis appears to have been short-lived.  
 
Table 4 Asia: Real GDP growth (%) 
      1960-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004  1992-2004*  Ratio-test  
              p-value 
South Asia  St. Dev  2,6  3,6  1,8  1,3     0,001*** 
   Mean  4,0  3,6  5,2  5,7      
India  St. Dev  3,2  4,4  2,4  1,5    0,001*** 
   Mean  3,9  3,5  5,3  6,1     
Bangladesh  St. Dev  4,9  6,7  1,2  0,5    0,000*** 
   Mean  3,2  2,0  3,7  5,0     
Sri Lanka  St. Dev  1,9  2,2  1,5  2,1    0,38 
   Mean  4,3  4,9  4,1  4,8     
Nepal  St. Dev  3,1  3,1  3,5  2,1    0,29 
   Mean  2,2  3,1  4,6  4,3     
Pakistan  St. Dev  3,0  2,8  1,1  1,9    0,03** 
   Mean  6,6  5,5  6,0  3,9     
East Asia & Pacific  St. Dev  7,4  2,0  1,5  2,5  1,7  0,000*** 
   Mean  4,9  6,5  7,7  7,9  8,6   
China  St. Dev  14,2  3,8  3,6  2,3  2,3  0,000*** 
   Mean  4,9  6,1  9,8  9,7  10,1   
Hong Kong, China  St. Dev  4,3  5,0  4,3  3,8  3,8  0,3 
   Mean  5,3  4,0  3,1  3,8  3,8   
Korea, Rep.  St. Dev  3,6  3,8  1,7  4,2  2,0  0,44 
   Mean  8,3  7,1  9,1  5,5  6,2   
Singapore  St. Dev  5,1  2,6  3,9  4,4  4,2  0,47 
   Mean  10,1  8,7  7,1  6,3  6,9   
Thailand  St. Dev  2,0  2,6  3,2  5,4  3,2  0,000*** 
   Mean  7,9  7,0  8,2  4,5  5,8   
Philippines  St. Dev  1,0  1,8  5,0  2,1  1,8  0,000*** 
   Mean  5,0  5,7  1,4  3,7  4,1   
Malaysia  St. Dev  1,4  3,1  3,7  4,9  3,0  0,01** 
   Mean  6,4  8,0  6,3  6,1  7,4   
Indonesia  St. Dev  4,1  1,2  2,6  5,6  1,6  0,11 
   Mean  4,4  8,0  6,5  4,1  5,9   
* excludes years 1998 and 1999 for East Asia and Pacific countries       
Data  source:  World  Bank,  World  Development  Indicators  (WDI),  September  2005,  ESDS 
International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester. Title and ownership of the data remain with the 
World Bank. 
Ratio test is a one-sided F-test for whether the variance is significantly different for the 1982-2004 
period than for 1960-1981.  
***, **, * =  significant at the 99 and  95 and 90% levels respectively 
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Table 5 Asia: Consumer price inflation (%) 
      1960-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004  Ratio-test  
                  p-value 
India  St. Dev  4,7  9,5  2,4  3,4   0.000*** 
   Mean  6,1  9,2  9,0  7,1    
Bangladesh  St. Dev      1,6  2,5    
   Mean      7,2  4,7    
Sri Lanka  St. Dev  2,5  7,5  5,4  3,2   0,03** 
   Mean  2,9  10,4  11,8  9,4    
Nepal  St. Dev  7,4  6,2  4,4  4,2    
   Mean  5,5  9,1  10,6  6,9    
Pakistan  St. Dev  2,6  7,6  2,4  3,7   0,000*** 
   Mean  3,6  13,1  7,0  7,5    
China  St. Dev      7,8  8,4    
   Mean      10,2  6,0    
Hong Kong, China  St. Dev      2,9  5,5    
   Mean      1,7  3,8    
Korea, Rep.  St. Dev  2,2  7,8  2,7  1,8   0,000*** 
   Mean  12,7  17,3  5,2  4,3    
Singapore  St. Dev  1,1  7,8  1,7  1,1   0,000*** 
   Mean  1,2  7,4  1,8  1,3    
Thailand  St. Dev  2,5  6,8  1,8  2,4   0,000*** 
   Mean  2,1  11,2  3,7  3,6    
Philippines  St. Dev  6,2  8,3  13,4  2,0   0,2 
   Mean  7,1  14,1  14,2  6,3    
Malaysia  St. Dev  1,6  4,6  1,8  1,3   0,000*** 
   Mean  1,0  6,8  2,7  2,8    
Indonesia  St. Dev  325,5  10,5  2,2  14,3   0,000*** 
   Mean  191,8  18,3  8,3  12,9    
Data source: World Development Indicators, see table 4 above 
Ratio test is a one-sided F-test for whether the variance is significantly different for the 1982-2004 
period than for 1960-1981.  
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Table 6 Latin America: Real GDP growth (%) 
      1960-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004  Ratio-test  
                  p-value 
Latin America &  St. Dev  1,8  2,2  2,4  2,2  0,79 
Caribbean  Mean  5,4  5,1  1,6  2,8   
Mexico   St. Dev  2,5  2,2  3,0  3,5  0,07* 
   Mean  6,5  7,2  1,5  2,9   
Argentina  St. Dev  5,0  5,1  6,7  6,7  0,11 
   Mean  4,2  1,9  0,5  2,8   
Brazil  St. Dev  3,7  5,2  4,2  2,1  0,07* 
   Mean  6,7  6,9  2,2  2,7   
Chile  St. Dev  2,9  6,6  6,4  3,6  0,47 
   Mean  4,6  2,7  4,3  5,5   
Colombia  St. Dev  1,4  2,1  1,7  2,6  0,11 
   Mean  5,3  5,2  3,6  2,7   
Ecuador  St. Dev  2,6  3,9  3,4  3,1  0,37 
   Mean  4,5  6,7  2,3  2,4   
Bolivia  St. Dev  5,5  3,2  3,6  1,5  0,02** 
   Mean  3,0  3,5  0,7  3,3   
Peru   St. Dev  2,4  2,9  8,0  3,9  0,000*** 
   Mean  5,2  4,0  -1,0  4,0   
Paraguay  St. Dev  2,2  2,8  3,4  2,0  0,12 
   Mean  4,4  9,2  2,2  1,8   
Uruguay  St. Dev  2,5  2,7  6,3  6,1  0,000*** 
   Mean  1,3  3,2  0,4  2,1   
Data source: World Development Indicators, see table 4 above 
Ratio test is a one-sided F-test for whether the variance is significantly different for the 1982-2004 
period than for 1960-1981.  
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Table 7 Latin America: Consumer price inflation (%) 
      1960-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004  Ratio-test  
                  p-value 
Mexico   St. Dev  1,5  7,7  39,3  10,5  0,000*** 
   Mean  3,0  19,1  68,6  14,2   
Argentina  St. Dev  8,8  118,2  1038,3  9,5  0,02** 
   Mean  22,7  148,6  793,7  6,6   
Brazil  St. Dev      902,1  760,5   
   Mean      647,0  392,0   
Chile  St. Dev  11,7  177,5  5,9  4,4  0,000*** 
   Mean  26,5  174,8  20,7  6,4   
Colombia  St. Dev  8,7  5,5  4,6  7,6  0,19 
   Mean  11,3  23,1  24,0  15,3   
Ecuador  St. Dev  1,6  4,3  18,2  24,4  0,000*** 
   Mean  4,3  6,2  2,1  2,3   
Bolivia  St. Dev  5,9  3,0  3,5  1,4  0,000*** 
   Mean  2,7  3,3  0,5  3,2   
Peru   St. Dev  4,58  24,7  2413,1  21,8  0,000*** 
   Mean  9,1  38,8  1257,0  15,4   
Paraguay  St. Dev  5,2  8,2  8,9  4,5  0,48 
   Mean  3,5  14,2  22,8  12,0   
Uruguay  St. Dev  36,6  18,9  26,5  21,0  0,41 
   Mean  45,7  65,0  69,3  25,1   
Data source: World Development Indicators, see table 4 above 
Ratio test is a one-sided F-test for whether the variance is significantly different for the 1982-
2004 period than for 1960-1981.  
***, **, * = significant at the 99 and  95 and 90% levels respectively 
 
The picture for Latin America is different from that for Asia. The variance of 
real GDP growth for the period 1982-2004 is not significantly different than for 
the period 1961-1981 at the 95% level for the Latin America aggregate. This 
viewed together with the changes in standard deviations for individual countries 
suggests that GDP volatility may not have declined or changed much in Latin 
America over the last two decades compared with earlier years. There has been 
a  statistically  significant  increase  in  volatility  in  Peru  and  Uruguay.  The 
volatility of inflation is extreme at times, and significantly higher in several 
countries in the latter decades. Inflation volatility is clearly lower in the latter 
decades only in the case of Chile. There were several  major crises in Latin 
America in the last decade, and these are evidently reflected in the inflation 
volatility figures.  
 
The variance of real GDP growth for the period 1982-2004 is not significantly 
different than for the period 1961-1981 at the 95% level for the Sub-Saharan 
Africa aggregate. However, standard deviation of GDP growth does appear to   9 
have fallen in some individual countries such as Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria 
and Botswana. It has also declined in the case of Middle East and North Africa. 
On the other hand, the volatility of consumer price inflation has not fallen in 
Africa,  and  in  some  cases  there  has  been  a  statistically  significant  increase 
(Nigeria, Cameroon, Zimbabwe). 
 
Table 8 Africa: Real GDP Growth  (%) 
      1960-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004  Ratio-test  
                  p-value 
Middle East &  St. Dev    5,5  3,3  1,1  0,001*** 
North Africa  Mean    3,8  3,7  3,8   
Algeria  St. Dev  14,9  7,4  3,0  2,5  0,000*** 
   Mean  3,1  7,8  2,4  2,9   
Egypt  St. Dev  3,1  4,7  2,6  1,0  0,000*** 
   Mean  5,3  6,7  5,2  4,4   
Sub-Saharan Africa  St. Dev  1,95  1,88  1,47  1,69  0,15 
   Mean  5,1  3,2  1,7  2,9   
South Africa  St. Dev  1,7  2,2  2,4  1,7  0,42 
   Mean  5,8  3,5  0,9  2,5   
Cote d'Ivoire  St. Dev  5,9  6,5  2,6  3,6  0,001*** 
   Mean  8,9  4,9  0,4  1,5   
Ghana  St. Dev  3,5  6,0  4,9  0,6  0,02** 
   Mean  3,2  -0,4  3,2  4,4   
Nigeria  St. Dev  12,0  7,7  5,7  2,6  0,000*** 
   Mean  5,9  2,2  3,1  3,1   
Zimbabwe  St. Dev  6,6  6,8  3,1  6,5  0,17 
   Mean  6,7  3,7  3,8  -0,2   
Cameroon  St. Dev  4,6  8,5  6,4  3,3  0,04** 
   Mean  2,3  8,1  1,5  2,8   
Botswana  St. Dev  6,5  5,8  4,0  1,5  0,03** 
   Mean  10,2  13,6  10,8  4,9   
Data source: World Development Indicators, see table 4 above 
Ratio test is a one-sided F-test for whether the variance is significantly different for the 1982-
2004 period than for 1960-1981.  
***, **, * =  significant at the 99 and  95 and 90% levels respectively 
 
The tables 10-12 below show the percentage of years within the specified time 
periods when real GDP growth has been less than 0.5%. This is used to capture 
frequency of recessions. This has fallen clearly in South Asia over the last two 
decades, but not in East Asia. On the other hand, in Latin America and Sub 
Saharan Africa, recessions appear to have become more frequent in the 1982-
2004  period.  There  may  be  a  variety  of  reasons,  but  what  emerges  is  that 
globalisation  has  been  accompanied  with  a  varying  record  of  economic 
volatility in the world as a whole.   10 
Table 9 Africa: Consumer Price Inflation (%) 
      1960-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004  Ratio-test  
                  p-value 
Algeria  St. Dev  2,8  4,3  6,2  12,1  0,01** 
   Mean  4,6  9,7  10,9  11,9   
Egypt  St. Dev  5,0  4,9  3,4  4,7  0,28 
   Mean  3,2  10,2  17,9  7,1   
South Africa  St. Dev  1,3  2,4  2,1  2,9  0,38 
   Mean  3,0  11,6  14,7  7,5   
Cote d'Ivoire  St. Dev  3,9  6,9  3,4  7,0  0,11 
   Mean  3,5  13,3  4,5  5,6   
Ghana  St. Dev  10,5  38,5  31,6  14,3  0,02** 
   Mean  8,4  54,2  37,1  25,6   
Nigeria  St. Dev  6,6  9,3  18,0  22,8  0,000*** 
   Mean  5,4  15,9  19,9  27,2   
Zimbabwe  St. Dev  1,0  4,8  5,8  36,1  0,03** 
   Mean  2,1  8,6  15,0  47,1   
Cameroon  St. Dev  3,6  3,2  6,5  10,4  0,02** 
   Mean  2,9  11,3  7,2  5,4   
Botswana  St. Dev    2,3  1,4  2,9  0,5 
   Mean     2,3  1,4  2,9    
Data source: World Development Indicators, see table 4 above 
Ratio test is a one-sided F-test for whether the variance is significantly different for the 1982-
2004 period than for 1960-1981.   
***, **, * =  significant at the 99 and  95 and 90% levels respectively 
 
 
Table 10 Asia: Frequency of recessions, percentage share of years 
   1961-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004 
South Asia  9  20  0  0 
India  18  20  0  0 
Bangladesh  27  20  0  0 
Sri Lanka  0  10  0  8 
Nepal  27  20  10  8 
Pakistan  9  0  0  0 
East Asia & Pacific  27  0  0  0 
China  36  10  0  0 
Hong Kong, China  0  10  10  15 
Korea, Rep.  0  10  0  8 
Singapore  9  0  10  15 
Thailand  0  0  0  15 
Philippines  0  0  30  15 
Malaysia  0  0  10  15 
Indonesia  9  0  0  8 
Number of years when GDP growth is less than 0.5% shown as a percentage share of number 
of years in period 
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Table 11 Latin America: Frequency of recessions, percentage share of 
years 
   1961-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004 
Latin America & Caribbean  0  10  30  31 
Mexico   0  0  30  15 
Argentina  27  40  50  38 
Brazil  0  10  30  15 
Chile  9  30  20  8 
Colombia  0  0  0  8 
Ecuador  9  0  30  15 
Bolivia  18  30  50  8 
Peru   9  20  50  23 
Paraguay  0  0  30  31 
Uruguay  36  20  40  38 
Number of years when GDP growth is less than 0.5% shown as a percentage share of number 
of years in period 
 
Table 12 Africa: Frequency of recessions, percentage share of years 
   1961-1971  1972-1981  1982-1991  1992-2004 
Middle East & North Africa  0  30  20  0 
Algeria  36  0  40  15 
Egypt  0  0  0  0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0  0  10  15 
South Africa  0  10  60  8 
Cote d'Ivoire  9  10  60  54 
Ghana  18  60  20  0 
Nigeria  36  30  40  8 
Zimbabwe  9  40  10  46 
Cameroon  9  20  50  23 
Botswana  0  0  0  0 
Number of years when GDP growth is less than 0.5% shown as a percentage share of number 
of years in period 
 
4 Explaining volatility 
 
A few possible determinants of the changes in volatility in both advanced and 
industrial countries are discussed below. 
 
Martin and Rowthorn (2004) find that the rise and fall in GDP growth over the 
entire  period  coincides  with  rises  and  falls  in  inflation.  They  attribute  the 
decline in growth volatility from the 1970s to improved monetary policy and 
changes in inflation behaviour. Inflation became less persistent, less responsive 
to  output,  and  less  volatile,  and  monetary  policy  improved  as  interest  rates 
became  more  responsive  to  changes  in  inflation.  Improvements  in  monetary 
policy  have  in  turn  led  to  a  decline  in  the  volatility  of  economic  shocks. 
However, they conclude that for stability to continue sound counter-inflation 
policies  as  well  as  absence  of  extreme  geopolitical  and  natural  disasters  are   12 
required, as such would induce volatility. Stock and Watson (2003) carry out a 
detailed  study  on  the  US  and  conclude  that  the  decline  in  volatility  is 
attributable to a combination of improved policy, “good luck” in productivity 
and commodity price shocks and other unknown forms of good luck.  
In  a  cross-sectional  analysis,  Easterly  et  al.  (2001)  also  find  that  economic 
volatility  (captures  as  volatility  of  inflation,  GDP  growth,  real  wage,  fiscal 
balance, private sector credit, money growth, inflation and terms of trade) is 
higher in non-OECD than OECD countries. Their regression results reveal that 
the volatility of GDP growth cannot be attributed to wage rigidities. Private 
capital flows or their volatility are not very relevant either, but they do find that 
financial  depth  (captured  as  private  sector  credit/GDP  or  stock  market 
capitalization/GDP)  reduces  volatility  up  to  a  point,  and  economic  openness 
tends to increase it. They also find some positive correlation between terms of 
trade volatility and output volatility, although this is not tested econometrically. 
Their analysis provides us with a set of hypotheses to be tested for the Indian 
case (section 6). 
 
5 Economic volatility in India 
 
India emerges as one of the developing countries where economic volatility has 
declined over the period 1980-2004. Table 13 shows standard deviations for 
Indian GDP growth over the last five decades. The evidence confirms that there 
has been a fairly considerable decline in GDP growth volatility in the period 
1980-2004  compared  with  the  period  1960-1979.  The  variance  of  real  GDP 
growth for the period 1980-2004 is significantly lower than for the period 1951-
1979 at the 99% level. 
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Table 13 Growth of real GDP by sector (%) 
   1951-1959  1960-1969  1970-1979  1980-1989  1990-2004  Ratio  Ratio test, p-value 
GDP                
St. dev.  2,6  3,7  4,2  2,3  1,8  1,8  0,001*** 
Mean  3,6  4,0  2,9  5,8  5,8  0,6  0,003*** 
Coeff. of var.  0,7  0,9  1,4  0,4  0,3      
Agriculture                
St. dev.  4,6  7,2  8,1  6,1  4,7  1,3  0,08* 
Mean  2,7  2,5  1,3  4,4  2,7  0,6  0,2 
Coeff. of var.  1,7  2,9  6,4  1,4  1,7      
Industry                
St. dev.  1,4  3,3  3,7  2,6  3,5  0,9  0,6 
Mean  5,8  6,2  4,4  7,4  6,0  0,8  0,07* 
Coeff. of var.  0,2  0,5  0,8  0,4  0,6      
Services                
St. dev.  2,0  1,3  2,0  1,2  1,8  1,1  0,3 
Mean  4,3  5,2  4,1  6,4  7,4  0,6  0,000*** 
Coeff. of var.  0,5  0,2  0,5  0,2  0,2       
***,  * significant at the 99% and 90% percent levels respectively          
Data source: Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Database on Indian Economy, 2005. Ratio = ratio 
between periods 1951-1979 and 1980-2004, Ratio = ratio between periods 1967-1977 and 
1978-2004, Ratio test is an F/t-test for whether the variance is significantly lower or mean 
significantly higher between these two periods. Coeff. of var. refers to the ratio of standard 
deviation to the mean. 
 
The volatility decrease is not as clear if one looks at the three components of 
GDP:  agriculture,  industry  and  services.  Volatility  in  agricultural  GDP  has 
declined since the 1980s from that in 1960-1979, and the decline is significant at 
the  90  percent  level,  but  no  noticeable  decline  has  occurred  in  the  case  of 
industry or services.  
 
A wealth of literature tries to identify the break points in the GDP growth rate 
for the Indian economy. It is fairly generally agreed that the turning point in 
Indian growth rate occurred in the year 1980. However, some claim that there 
have  also  been  other  earlier  or  later  breaks.  A  simple  one  tailed  t-test  for 
differences in means between the periods 1951-1979 and 1980-2004 reveals that 
there was a statistically significant increase in the growth rate for aggregate 
GDP (see table 13 above). There has been a statistically significant increase in 
the  service  sector  and  industry  growth  rates.  The  composition  of  GDP  has 
changed remarkably over the time period. The share of agriculture in GDP has 
fallen from 58% in 1950 to 21% in 2004, and the share of services has risen 
from 32% to 58%. 
 
Using  sequential  F-tests  for  statistical  significance  for  the  all  years  between 
1951 and 2001, Wallack (2003) confirms that the aggregate annual GDP growth 
rate increased significantly and permanently in the year 1980. She also finds a   14 
significant break in the GNP growth series in the year 1987. By examining the 
separate  components  of  GDP,  Wallack  (2003)  finds  statistically  significant 
additional break dates in the year 1992 for trade, transport and communication 
and in 1974 for finance, insurance, real estate and business. She suggests that 
these breaks in different sectors can be linked roughly to policy changes in the 
areas, such as the trade liberalisation and reforms in the telecommunications 
sector  and  growth  of  the  IT  sector  in  1992,  and  a  period  of  extremely  low 
interest rates in 1974. She associates the break in the overall growth rate in 1980 
to an investment boom.  
 
Using a similar method to identify break points (Chow test), Virmani (2004) 
also  locates  the  change  in  overall  growth  on  the  year  1980.  While  Wallack 
appears to find some evidence that there might be another break in the year 
1993, Virmani finds that taking into account the 1980 break and variation in 
rainfall, there are no additional breaks in GDP growth. He thus concludes that 
the reforms of the early 1990s did not mark a beginning of a new phase – the 
phase that began in 1980 is still going on. Sarkar (2004) also finds no change in 
trend behaviour of real GDP since 1991 in comparison with the earlier period. A 
simple F-test of our figures in table 13 reveals that the variance of GDP growth 
is not statistically different in 1990-2004 from that in 1980-1989. 
 
The evidence broadly confirms that the GDP growth rate increased in 1980, and 
the volatility of growth fell. The change in volatility can be seen in the figures 1 
and 2. Figure 2 shows the 5-year moving average and standard deviation of the 
real GDP growth series. It reveals that there is a significant decline in volatility 
and an increase in the average growth rate in year 1980 (in the figure 2 the 
decline is located at year 1984 as it shows the standard deviation and mean over 
the past 5 years).  
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Data source: Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Database on Indian Economy, 2005 
 
In addition to GDP volatility, the volatility of inflation has also declined overt 
the decades in India, as can be seen from table 14 below, which shows the 
standard deviation and mean of agricultural worker CPI (CPIAL). The standard 
deviation of CPIAL for the period 1978-2004 (5.1) is significantly lower than 
for the period 1967-1977 (14.1) at the 99% level. However, the difference in 
average inflation between the two periods is not statistically significant. Figure 
3 below shows a 5-year moving average/standard deviation for inflation, and the 
decline in volatility can be situated approximately around the year 1977. 
 
Table 14 Consumer Price Inflation (CPIAL, Agricultural labourer), % 
   1967-1977  1978-1988  1989-1996  1997-2004  Ratio  Ratio test 
                  p-value 
St. dev.  14,1  5,3  5,3  3,6  2,7  0,000*** 
Mean  6,3  7,5  10,0  4,3  0,9  0,6 
*** significant at the 99% level         
Data  source:  Reserve  Bank  of  India  (RBI),  Database  on  Indian  Economy.  Ratio  =  ratio 
between periods 1967-1977 and 1978-2004, Ratio test is an F/t-test for whether the variance 
is significantly lower or mean significantly higher between these two periods. 
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Data source: Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Database on Indian Economy, 2005 
 




There are a number of specific hypotheses concerning the reduced volatility of 
the Indian economy, which have important policy implications, and therefore 
deserve systematic examination. The econometric analysis in this section tests 
the following hypotheses: 
•  An elementary hypothesis is the change in the structure of the economy 
from  agriculture  to  manufacturing  and  services.  To  what  extent  is  the 
reduced  volatility  due  to  the  structural  changes  in  the  economy?  To 
capture this change, the econometric analysis uses the share of agriculture 
per GDP as an explanatory variable.  
•  The role of international private capital flows. Do such flows raise or 
reduce volatility? 
•  It has been argued by leading policy makers that the government’s ability 
to manage the economy has improved. A strong form of this hypothesis is 
that  there  has  been  a  trend  reduction  in  the  volatility  of  GDP  growth 
because of greater knowledge of the economy by policy makers and their 
ability  to  anticipate  how  to  cope  with  economic  shocks.  Inflation  and 
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budget deficit as a share of GDP are used to reflect the government’s 
policy choices.  
•  Another hypothesis concerns the impact of trade openness on volatility. It 
is argued perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively that this should not lead 
to greater, but to lower volatility.  
•  The role of financial sector development and financial liberalisation has 
been  emphasised  by  some  economists  as  an  important  determinant  of 
volatility.   
•  The  role  of  shocks,  such  as  changes  in  terms  of  trade  will  also  be 
considered. 
•  Finally, the rate of GDP growth itself may matter for volatility. Is higher 
growth associated with more volatility? 
 
To sum up, in the context of a multivariate analysis, volatility could be regarded 
as being influenced by openness, financial development, management by the 
government, shocks, and the structure of the economy. These hypotheses will be 
investigated  in  the  next  section  by  means  of  time  series  analysis.  Policy 
implications for India on how to maintain stability or reduce volatility will be 
derived from the results of the analysis.  
 
6.2 Measuring volatility 
 
In the above analysis, volatility of GDP growth over decades is measured using 
the standard deviation. However, for the purposes of econometric time series 
analysis, an annual measure is required.  
 
The  GDP  growth  series  was  not  found  to  adhere  to  an  ARCH  or  GARCH 
processes, which are a few standard volatility processes. We decided to opt for a 
measure based on a two step forecast error of GDP growth
iii. A similar measure 
to  ours  has  been  used  by  Servén  (1998)  to  capture  uncertainty  of  various 
variables in a study of the effects of economic uncertainty on investment in 
developing countries.  
 
The  precise  volatility  measure  used  in  this  paper  is  based  on  the  recursive 
estimation of the following equation 
 
t t t t ε + γt + y β + y β + α = y 2 2 1 1          1) ( − −  
 
where yt  is real GDP growth and t represents time. This was carried for all years 
for  which  GDP  data  was  available  (1950-2004),  so  that  the  sample  size 
increases by year.
iv The volatility measure is the three-year mean absolute value 
of the forecast error of equation (1). A three-year mean is used as the changes in   18 
the forecast error itself can be judged to be artificially large, and a better fit in 
the regression model is found by using a mean.  
 
However,  the  analysis  was  also  repeated  using  a  simple  three-year  moving 
standard  deviation  of  GDP  growth  as  an  alternative  volatility  measure.  This 
measure is not very different from the forecast error based one (see figure 4 
below), but is not as theoretically appealing as the forecast error, the purpose of 
which  is  to  reflect  unexpected  changes  in  growth,  which  are  the  essence  of 
economic  uncertainty  and  volatility.  However,  for  general  purposes,  the 
standard  deviation  is  a  decent  approximation.  The  two  measures  are  shown 
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6.3 Data 
 
The variables used to test the hypotheses presented in section 6.1 are shown in 
table 15 below. 
 
Table 15 Data 
VARIABLE  SOURCE 
Real GDP growth (%)  
AGR/GDP: Share of agriculture in GDP (%) 
CPI: Consumer price inflation for agricultural workers 
(CPIAL) (%) 
TOT: Terms of trade, percentage change.  
Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Database on 
Indian Economy, 2005. 
 
FD/GDP: Gross fiscal deficit as a share of GDP (%)  Reserve  Bank  of  India,  Handbook  of 
Statistics on Indian Economy, 2005. 
Trade (Imports + Exports) as a share of GDP (%) 
PC/GDP: Private sector credit as a share of GDP (%) 
PCF/GDP: Private capital flows as a share of GDP (%) 
 
World  Development  Indicators,  World 
Bank, September 2005. 
 
Unfortunately, due to insufficient data on some of the variables, the analysis 
cannot  be  carried  out  from  the  year  1950  onwards.  The  period  used  in  the 
analysis  is  1970-2003.    Due  to  the  shortness  of  the  period,  econometric 
estimation cannot be done for two separate periods.  
 
Table 16 Results of unit root tests 
   ADF  trend, lags  PP  trend, lags   order 
                 
AGR/GDP  -4.9  yes, 1  -4.9  yes, 1   I(0) 
CPI   -4.7  no, 1  -4.7  yes, 1  I(0) 
GDP growth   -5.3  yes, 1  -7.8  yes, 1  I(0) 
FD/GDP   -1.9  yes, 1  -2  yes, 1  I(1) 
PCF/GDP  -3.4  yes, 1  -3.9  yes,1  I(1) 
PC/GDP   -0.8  no, 1  -0.8  no, 1  I(1) 
TOT   -4.9  no, 2  -5.2  no, 2  I(0) 
Trade/GDP  -1.2  no, 1  -1.2  no, 1  I(1) 
VOL (Volatility)   -5.2  yes, 2  -3.7  yes, 2  I(0) 
All regressions include a constant. VOL = forecast error based measure 
I(0) = stationary, I(1) = unit root 
 
Before turning to the regression analysis, unit root tests were carried out for 
each variable. Both  the Dickey-Fuller (or augmented version, ADF) and the 
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were used. The results are shown in table 15 below, 
which also shows the number of lags and whether a trend was included in the 
test  regression.  The  Phillips-Perron  test  was  used  as  it  allows  for  milder 
conditions concerning the distribution of errors (Enders, 1995). 
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Table 16 shows FD/GDP, trade/GDP, PC/GDP and PCF/GDP are found to be 
non-stationary and are differenced in the regressions. Additionally, AGR/GDP, 
GDP  growth  and  the  volatility  measure  are  de-trended  by  removing  the 
estimated  time  trend.  The  time  series  regression  will  then  include  only 
stationary variables and looks at short-run relationships.  
 
6.4 Results  
 
Table 17 below shows the results of the regression analysis, where the forecast 
error measure is used to capture volatility of GDP growth.
v The results in the 
table correspond to the preferred model to which we arrived at using general-to-
specific  methodology.  This  particular  specification  passes  all  standard 
diagnostic tests.  
 
There is no direct interpretation to the volatility measure used, so it is more of 
interest to concentrate on the statistical significance of the variables than the 
size of the coefficients.  
 
Table 17 Time series regression 1972-2003 
Dependent variable: Volatility (forecast error)    
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic 
VOL (-1)  0.42  0.14  2.91*** 
AGR/GDP (-2)  0.26  0.13  1.97* 
GDP growth (-1)  0.08  0.04  1.90* 
TOT (-1)  -0.03  0.01  -2.93*** 
D (Trade/GDP)  0.10  0.09  1.08 
D (PC/GDP)  -0.16  0.08  -2.12** 
        
R
2  0.50     
Adjusted R
2  0.40       
Diagnostic tests          
Normality (Jarque-Bera): 1.11(0.57)     
White heteroskedasticity (F-test): 0.94 (0.53)     
Serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey): 0.91 (0.42)    
***, **, * = statistically significant at the 99, 95 and 90 percent levels respectively 
D = difference 
 
The results in table 17 show that volatility is persistent as it depends positively 
and significantly on previous volatility. However, this may be partly because the 
volatility measure is constructed by averaging three consecutive forecast errors. 
Volatility of growth is increased by a higher degree of agriculture/GDP (with 
two lags). The previous section already revealed that agricultural output is more 
volatile than output of other sectors. The results also show that higher growth 
(lagged) is associated with more volatility, although the model only captures 
short-run relationships. In the long run, this would not hold, as the previous   21 
section  shows.  However,  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  volatility 
measure is functionally constructed from the growth series, and thus one should 
be cautious in interpreting the significance of this variable.  
 
An  increase  in  terms  of  trade  lowers  GDP  volatility  as  does  private  sector 
credit/GDP, an indicator of financial depth. External influences such as trade or 
private capital flows are statistically insignificant, and thus cannot be said to 
have increases economic instability. This is also the case for inflation and the 
budget deficit.  
 
Although trade/GDP is not statistically significant, it is included in the final 
model  as  it  produces  an  improvement  in  fit  (based  on  R
2  and  Akaike 
information criteria). However, it must be acknowledged that if this variable is 
removed,  only  past  volatility,  terms  of  trade  and  GDP  growth  remain 
statistically significant (same coefficient signs). 
 
As mentioned above, the regression analysis was repeated using a simple three-
year  moving  standard  deviation  of  GDP  growth  as  a  robustness  check.  The 
results  are  not  shown,  but  are  discussed  briefly  here.  Using  this  volatility 
measure produces a worse regression fit, and thus the other measure might be 
preferred in addition to its theoretical appeal. But, this alternative model does 
reveal  that  the  results  are  sensitive  to  the  specification  of  volatility.  In  this 
model, only terms of trade changes and perhaps surprisingly in comparison with 
the previous model, trade/GDP are statistically significant. The former lowers 
volatility,  whereas  the  latter  increases  it.  This  suggests  a  stronger  role  for 
external influences as the model in table 17. The signs of coefficients are the 
same as in table 17. Trade/GDP was not significant in the first model, but the 
sign of the coefficient was the same in both models.  
 
The  result  on  changes  in  terms  of  trade  remains  robust  to  all  model 
specifications, and an improvement is found to lower volatility. This is a strong 
result and suggests that external shocks have played a role in the volatility of 
growth  India.    For  various  reasons  mentioned  above,  we  can  argue  that  the 
model in table 17 is the preferred model for explaining volatility. Thus we could 
conclude that the share of agriculture in GDP and financial depth are likely to 
have  influenced  GDP  volatility  in  India  at  least  to  some  extent.  Volatility 
declines  as  the  share  of  agriculture  falls  or  in  other  words  as  the  economy 
undergoes a structural change, and when financial depth increases. Openness to 
trade may have increased volatility, but this is not a robust result.  
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It would be interesting to carry out a more detailed analysis, such as testing for 
non-linear  relationships  between  growth  and  volatility  or  between  financial 
depth and volatility or private capital flows and volatility to examine. However, 
due to the relative shortness of time series, it was decided to limit the analysis to 
a very basic model.   
 
The analysis above is only able to capture short run relationships. Future work 
will  look  at  the  relationships  between  average  GDP  volatility,  and  variables 
such as GDP growth, the share of agriculture in GDP and various state-specific 
variables at the level of separate Indian states over a long time period.  
 
7 Insecurity and economic volatility 
 
The purpose of this section is to assess the developments in a few indicators of 
security or well-being in the countries described above. Lack of time series data 
prohibits a more detailed analysis, so the section focuses on developments in 
unemployment, poverty and income inequality for the periods for which data is 
available. The measurement of these indicators is not without problems, and 
even comparability between countries can be questionable, but the purpose here 
is to provide a  
brief overview.  
 
Tables  18-20  below  show  the  average  total  unemployment  rate  for  different 
countries for the period 1980-2000.
vi It is questionable whether unemployment 
is a meaningful concept in low-income countries, and data was unavailable for 
African countries. 
 
Table 18 Latin America: Average unemployment rate (% of total labour 
force) 
   1980-1984  1985-1989  1990-1994  1995-2000 
Argentina  3,9  5,7  8,4  15,9 
Brazil  4,0  3,2  5,5  7,9 
Chile  14,0  8,1  5,2  6,5 
Colombia  10,1  11,4  8,9  13,6 
Mexico    2,5  3,4  3,7 
Peru    6,0  8,5  7,6 
Paraguay  6,3  5,5  5,3  8,2 
Uruguay    9,1  8,8  10,5 
Venezuela  8,5  10,1  8,6  11,9 
Source: World Development Indicators, see table 4 above 
 
Over  the  1980-2000  period,  the  previous  section  revealed  that  economic 
stability  had  not  declined,  and  had  perhaps  even  increased  in  some  Latin 
American countries. Unemployment rates appear to have increased in many of   23 
the countries over this period, and have fallen only in Chile, where economic 
volatility has declined in the 1990s in comparison with the 1980s.  
 
Table 19 Asia: Average unemployment rate (% of total labour force) 
   1980-1984  1985-1989   1990-94  1995-2000 
Bangladesh  1,8  1,2  1,9  2,5 
China  3,2  2,1  2,5  3,0 
Korea (Rep.)  4,4  3,2  2,5  4,0 
Malaysia  5,8  7,2  3,9  2,9 
Pakistan  3,7  3,3  5,0  5,8 
Philippines  5,5  7,7  8,6  8,8 
Singapore  2,9  4,2  2,3  3,4 
Thailand  2,1  3,5  1,8  2,0 
Source: World Development Indicators, see table 4 above 
 
Table 20: Industrial countries: Average unemployment rate (% of total 
labour force) 
   1960-1969  1970-1979  1980-1984  1985-1989  1990-1994  1995-1999  2000-2004 
France      8,1  9,5  10,0  11,2  9,1 
Germany      5,3  6,4  6,3  8,5  8,3 
Italy      7,2  9,2  9,3  11,2  8,9 
Japan  1,3  1,8  2,4  2,6  2,4  3,7  5,0 
UK        10,2  9,8  7,2  5,1 
US  4,8  6,4  8,3  6,2  6,6  4,9  4,8 
Source: Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), Main Economic 
Indicators (MEI) 2005, ESDS International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester. Title and 
ownership of the data remain with OECD. 
 
In Asia, the changes in unemployment rates over the last two decades vary by 
country, and cannot be clearly related to findings on economic volatility for 
these decades. In industrial countries, despite the stabilisation of the economy, 
with the exception of the UK, unemployment rates have not declined within 
1980-2004. For the two countries with data from 1960 onwards – Japan and the 
US  –  unemployment  has  not  fallen  in  the  latter  decade  compared  with  the 
former. In Japan it has increased. Although probably imprecise, this evidence 
does suggest that the increase in economic stability in the industrial world may 
not have strengthened security, if measured as changes in unemployment.  
 
There are other dimensions in the area of employment, relating to changes in the 
nature of employment contracts and impact of external pressures on wages that 
might provide deeper insights to changes in insecurity, but time series data is 
not  available  or  easily  obtained.  The  rest  of  this  section  examines  briefly 
changes in income inequality and poverty. 
 
Inequality  and  poverty  are  the  other  indicators  we  use  to  assess  social 
developments.  Measuring  inequality  is  not  straightforward.  The  most   24 
comprehensive database on income inequality for a large number of countries, 
the income inequality WIID database of the World Institute for Development 
Economics  Research  (WIDER),  includes  a  number  of  series  per  country 
constructed  from  different  sources.  To  obtain  some  insights  into  possible 
changes  in  income  inequality  in  some  of  the  countries  examined,  this  paper 
relies on existing work. The results for individual countries can be debated, as 
the evidence below does not utilise country-specific studies, but are there to 
provide a general picture. 
 
Ravallion and Chen (1997) look at changes in income inequality and poverty 
over the time period 1981-1994 in 42 developing countries. The data is based on 
household surveys. They look at 64 spells for these countries, where one spell is 
defined as a period between two surveys conducted in a country. Even though 
data availability on income distribution for developing countries has improved 
in  the  time  period  they  consider,  there  are  still  considerable  deficiencies, 
especially in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. For this reason spells that could be 
analysed for this region were identified only for four countries.  
 
Ravallion and Chen conclude that inequality rose more often than fell only in 
the case of East Asia between 1981 and 1994.  In Latin America it fell (10 out 
of 14 spells) more often than rose, and the same holds for South Asia, where 
inequality fell in 6 out of 10 spells. Their results suggest no clear link between 
inequality  and  economic  instability  in  the  regions  examined  in  the  previous 
sections. On the other hand, they find that poverty fell in 7 out of 9 spells in 
East Asia, where economic instability also declined. However, poverty fell in 
only 4 out of 10 spells in South Asia and rose in 6 out of 14 spells in Latin 
America and in 5 out of 7 spells in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Sala-i-Martin and Mohapatra (2002) use a more extended dataset to estimate 
income distributions for all G20 countries for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
1998. Their estimates on income distributions for these countries are used to 
produce  table  21  below  that  compares  changes  in  poverty  and  income 
distribution for the years 1970 and 1998. The table shows our interpretations of 
the  authors'  results  on  poverty  and  income  inequality  based  on  distribution 
graphs  for  each  country  and  should  be  considered  as  approximations.  If  the 
change was not clearly significant, inequality and poverty were considered to 
have stayed “roughly the same”. 
 
The estimations of Sala-i-Martin and Mohapatra also show that the relationship 
between inequality and economic instability is ambiguous. Economic volatility 
was shown to have declined in China and USA, but income inequality appears 
to  have  risen  in  these  cases.  In  Argentina,  where  economic  volatility  has   25 
accelerated, both inequality and poverty appear to have increased. On the other 
hand,  economic  volatility  has  not  changed  much  over  the  decades  in  South 
Africa,  but  both  inequality  and  poverty  have  also  risen.  According  to  our 
interpretation, poverty appears to have declined everywhere except for South 
Africa, and Argentina (where economic stability has increased in the latter).  
 
Table 21 Changes in inequality and poverty from 1970 to 1998  
   Poverty   Inequality  
Argentina  rose  rose 
Brazil  fell  roughly same 
Mexico  fell  fell 
China  fell  rose 
Korea  fell  roughly same 
India  fell  roughly same 
Indonesia  fell  fell 
France  fell  roughly same 
Germany  fell  roughly same 
Italy   fell  fell 
Japan  fell  fell 
UK  fell  roughly same 
USA  fell  rose 
South Africa  rose  rose 
These are authors’ interpretations of the results of Sala-i-Martin and Mohapatra (2002) 
 
The analysis reveals that the relationship between insecurity and instability is 
ambiguous and complex. 
 
8 Concluding remarks on economic growth, instability and insecurity  
 
This paper has revealed that the last two decades of increased globalisation have 
been  met  with  a  varying  degree  of  economic  volatility  around  the  world. 
Whereas volatility has declined almost universally in the advanced countries, 
the  picture  is  more  mixed  for  developing  countries.  In  Asia,  and  especially 
South  Asia,  volatility  has  declined,  and  the  rate  of  growth  has  increased. 
However, in many Latin America countries volatility has risen, and the growth 
record is unimpressive. There has been little change in Africa.   
 
Thus, concerning the link between economic growth and volatility, the evidence 
suggests that some volatility may always be associated with economic growth, 
and  that  we  need  to  be  cautious  in  making  judgements  about  the  level  of 
volatility. The fears that globalisation would generate higher growth at the cost 
of economic stability, have not materialised in South Asia. On the other hand 
Latin  America  has  suffered  from  excessive  volatility  accompanied  with  low 
rates of growth.  
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The  paper  also  reveals  that  at  a  general  level,  the  link  between  insecurity, 
captured  by  poverty,  inequality  and  unemployment  rates  and  volatility  is 
unclear. It is not possible to conclude that stability would automatically generate 
improvements in security. In advanced countries, despite the fall in volatility, 
there has not been success in tackling unemployment. 
 
The econometric evidence shows that in the case of India, short run volatility 
can be linked to external shocks (terms of trade), structural changes in economy, 
and  financial  depth.  The  move  away  from  agriculture  and  an  increase  in 
financial depth are found to lower volatility. Terms of trade developments have 
also been more favourable, and contributed to a fall in GDO volatility.  
 
In the end we return to the question raised in the introduction: has the business 
cycle been tamed, at least in the advanced countries by measures such as central 
bank independence? The answer to this question is likely to be negative, since 
there are currently huge monetary imbalances in the world economy, which can 
have important implications for global GDP volatility.  
 
There is a large ongoing debate on whether these imbalances will result in a 
hard landing for the US economy. This question is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but many would agree that the possibility of a hard landing for the US 
cannot be ruled out. If such a hard landing were to occur, it could again have 
devastating consequences for the developing world, as did the hard landing of 
1979-83. Even countries, such as India and China might not escape. In view of 
the greater financial integration that exists in the world today, a recession in 
advanced  countries  could  lead  to  acute  financial  instability  in  developing 
countries,  involving  stock  market  crashes  and  banking  crises.  Although 
financial  globalisation  is  by  no  means  complete,  it  is  more  advanced  than 
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Notes 
i Much more sophisticated measures of volatility can be used but it turns out that 
simple standard deviation conveys the main stylised facts very well. 
ii Using the coefficient of variation instead of standard deviation led to broadly 
similar results. 
iii The measure based on a one step forecast error was also constructed. It did not 
differ remarkably from the other, but the two-step forecast error measure 
produced a better fit in the regression analysis. 
iv The volatility measure is not very different if the years 1970-2004 are used 
instead as the sample for these regressions. 
v The regressions are carried out with EViews software. 
vi The data was not available in World Development Indicators for earlier years.   28 
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